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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the fcmrt of Appeals :i n State of Utah v.
Raymond Ortiz. which was fi led October

3, ] 98 9,

88803 78 • CIS i i i at ;, 1: .ac :hed I: i< n < * t >, On November 1 1 989, the Petitioner
filed a Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeals which was
denied on November

J.989.

?
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suppl*
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. November

11.
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t'conl,

attached hereto as Appendix "i" ,

Judge Kenneth

Rigtrup

/I, (jpy of1 h.is order, is

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing
which was timely filed on November 9, 1989.

The Petition for

Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition for Write of
Certiorari must be filed.

Rule 45(c), Rules of the Utah Supreme

Court provide that this Petition is timely filed and the Court has
jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 78^2-2(5) (Supp.

1988) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by this
Court on March 21, 1989. Originally, this case was an appeal from
a judgment and conviction in the Third Judicial District in and for
Salt

Lake

County,

State

of

Utah, Honorable

Kenneth

Rigtrup

presiding.
The Defendant-Appellant was charged in an Information with
Two Counts of Theft, a Second Degree Felony, and was convicted of
both Counts. After trial, the Court sentenced the Defendant on one
Count after granting the Motion of the Defendant to sentence on
both Counts of being part of a single criminal episode.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts are set forth in the Appellant's opening brief at
pages 3 to 9.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Defendant-Appellant respectfully submits that a Petition for
Rehearing should be granted in this case for two reasons.
2
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1989).
ARGUMENT
THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REHEARD AFTER
THE FULL RECORD IS BEFORE THE COURT
AND THE COURT CAN THEN DETERMINE IF
THE ALLEGED ERROR WAS PREJUDICIAL
Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" i s a copy of an order by the
Third District Court granting the Defendant's Motion to Supplement
lln

KtM;uii!

I

IlkiI document

denied the Defendant
should

review

the

dicates that the txi^

Motion
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The Defendant further submits that the court misconstrued and
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Tl le conduc t:

of the Prosecutor uneguivocally called to the attention of the
jurors

matters
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•

no-

he
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in
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)efendant d:

because the testimony

their
ha rm 1 e s s

: n,

intent

should

have been considered fairly without the improper argument by the
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that

the

Defendant; -:.:: not tirsr t)r*«;g ; . s conviction before the jury until
after

the

court

denied
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-v*
3
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I i ni i I" flu-: ust- ul

llm

conviction•
The decision of the Court of Appeals allows the Prosecutor to
improperly argue the use of felony convictions and then hide the
error behind the standard cautionary instruction which is given in
any case about the use of the felony convictions*

The Defendant's

convictions were received for only a specific purpose, over his
objection, and not for the purpose which the Prosecutor argued to
the jury in this matter*

The Supreme Court and this Court in a

long line of decisions have been very cautious and careful in
allowing the use of felony convictions for improper purposes under
the Rules of Evidence*

See, State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep*

12 (Utah, 1988) and State v* Parsons, 119 Utah, Adv* Rep. 19
(Utah, 1989)*

The court should not allow the decision of the

Court of Appeals to water-down that precedent.
The Defendant-Appellant submits, based on the supplemental
record that justice requires the Court to re-evaluate both Point
I and Point II of the prior decision by granting the Petition for
Certiorari.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR
THEFT BY DECEPTION.
Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a pretrial Motion to limit
evidence of prior convictions under Utah Rules of Evidence 609.
(Transcript of Pretrial Motions of 3-31-88, page 2.) The Defendant
had been convicted in November, 1987, with the felony offenses of

4

Communications Fraud and Theft by Deception, and the defense made
a pretrial Motion to limit this evidence which was heard by the
trial Court and denied.

(See Supplemental Order)

The Curt of

Appeals did not decide this issue because of the defective record.
The Defendant argued that under the authority of State v.
Gentry, 747 P.2d, 1032 (Utah, 1987), and Rule 609 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, that the prior convictions in Utah for Theft by
Deception must be excluded in the pending Theft by Deception
matter.

In Gentry* the Supreme Court held that in an aggravated

sexual assault trial, the Defendant's prior rape conviction should
have been excluded at trial. After noting that the crime of rape
did not inherently reflect the Defendant's credibility, the Court
stated:
Also significant is the similarity between the
conviction and the crime for which defendant was tried,
aggravated sexual assault. This was highly likely to
prejudice jurors and unduly influence their conclusion
concerning defendant's guilt.
Counsel for the Defendant Ortiz, argued in support of the Motion
as follows:
So I would submit that the Court cannot, just
because the prior offense is Theft by Deception or
Communications Fraud, determine that they are necessarily
involving dishonesty or false statements.
Finally, I think that under Rule 403, that this
Court has discretion to use the weighing factors set
forth in Subparagraph (1) of Paragraph (a) to determine
even if it's an offense that involves dishonesty or false
statements. That under Rule 403, which is — the Court
can still determine that the prejudicial effect and the
prejudicial effect of having similar offenses coming in
against Mr. Ortiz if he takes the stand outweighs the
probative value. The Court's inherent power under Rule
403 to control the trial would also give the Court power,
and we'd ask the Court to grant the motion on that basis.

5

The Court denied the Motion and allowed the Defendant to be
examined about the conviction.

The Defendant testified on direct

questioning concerning the conviction in an attempt to mitigate the
result of the Court's ruling.
In the recent case of State v. Wight (Case Number 87-558-CA,
Utah, 1988) the Court of Appeals extensively reviewed the federal
decision concerning Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence.

Indicating

that the new Utah Rules of Evidence were intended to provide a
fresh starting place, the Court followed interpretations given to
Rule 609 by the federal cases of United States v. Carroll, 663 F.
Supp. 210 (D. Md. 1986) and United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F. 2d
1049 (D.C. Cir., 1983).

This case is now in conflict with the

precedent of the Wight decision.
In Wight, the Court indicated that under 609 (a)(2) inquiry
should be made regarding the particular facts involved to determine
if honesty was a factor.
involved

in

the

If the trial court finds honesty is

underlying

offense,

evidence

of

the

prior

conviction is automatically admissible under 609 (a)(2).
The critical consequences of denying the Motion to Exclude
the Evidence in the context of this case is graphically illustrated
by the manner in which the prosecutor used the conviction in
closing argument.

The record reflects the following argument to

the jury:
MR. IWASAKI: The fact that a witness has been convicted
of a felony and/or convicted of a crime involving
dishonest or false statement is to be used by you only
in weighing his credibility.

6

I'm not saying, "Find Mr. Ortiz guilty of Theft by
Deception because he's previously been convicted of Theft
by Deception, and he's previously been convicted of a
Communications Fraud.
Even though the dates of those convictions are less than
a year apart in 1985, 1986, and now, he's also charged
in 1987 with identical crimes, that is not the purpose
of the felony convictions. That is to be used only if
you find and believe that such a fact indicates a person
is more likely to tell a falsehood to question his
credibility.
I've heard other arguments in other cases where it says,
"Well, look if he gets on the stand and has to admit to
those felonies and take the risk of being convicted on
that, he must be telling the truth." Well, he obviously
didn't change his behavior from 1985 to 1986.
MR GAITHER:

I am going to object, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. IWASAKI: The testimony is not believable, and it is
a basis for you to look at the prior felony convictions.
(Transcript of the Trial, page 151).
Therefore, the Court should review this matter by granting the
Writ of Certiorari.

CONCLUSION
Because the Court of Appeals did not have the full record
before it, Mr. Ortiz respectfully petitions this Court to grant
certiorari and reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new
trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of December, 1989.

RANDALL GAITHER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

The undersigned hereby certifies that four

(4) true and

correct copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari
was mailed to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, by depositing same in the U.S* Mail,
postage prepaid*

Dated this

day of

, 1989 •
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OPINION
Cite as

118 UUk Adv. Rep. 75
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Raymond ORTIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 880378-CA
FILED: October 3, 1989

DAVIDSON, Judge:

CODE»C
Provo, Uti

Corona became suspicious as defendant ha
previously told him he had already obtaine
the SBA loan. Corona called Gray at Vallc
Bank and was informed that there were n
records of any loan applications from him.
Corona pursued defendant in an attempt t
get his money back but was unsuccessfu
Corona did not receive an SBA loan as
result of his transactions with defendant.
At trial. Gray testified that standard pro<
edures for obtaining an SBA loan did n<
include fee advancements of $5,000 or $10,00
and that he did not receive any fees froi
either defendant or Corona. Carl Vil
Warnock, a commercial loan specialist for th
SBA, testified that he searched all SBA Ioa
applications for the months of July an
August 1987 and found none relating t
Corona, "Reggie's Rock'N R," or defendani
He also testified that $10,000 in advance fei
is not a prerequisite for an SBA loan.
Defendant was convicted of two counts c
theft by deception after a jury trial held o
March 31,1988.

Defendant appeals from his conviction of
theft by deception, a violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-405 (1978). Defendant comends that evidence of his prior convictions was
improperly admitted, that the prosecutor's
comments in dosing argument were prejudicial, and that these errors constituted grounds
for a new trial. Defendant also contends that
the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction. We affirm.
In Jury 1987, Reginald Corona, owner of
"Reggie's Rock'N R" bar located in Murray.
Utah, became acquainted with defendant at
Eagle Tire, a tire shop located near his bar.
Defendant indicated to Corona that he had
just purchased Eagle Tire by borrowing money
through the Small Business Administration
(SBA). Corona told defendant that he was
also interested in obtaining an SBA loan for
approximately $350,000 to $400,000. Defendant informed Corona that he knew someone I
PRIOR CONVICTIONS
who could get an SBA loan for him. DefenPrior to trial, defendant presented a motio
dant told Corona he would have to "front
some money to show that [he] was in good in limine, seeking to exclude evidence of hi
faith," and that he had advanced $10,000 to prior convictions of communications frau
get his loan. Defendant also told Corona that and theft by deception. The trial court too
with the exception of "points," Corona would this motion under advisement, but nothing i
have his $10,000 returned upon qualifying for the record shows that the judge ever ruled o
the loan. Corona told defendant to speak with the motion. Defendant argues that the motio
was denied and that the trial court erred 1
his contact about getting the loan.
admitting the evidence of his prior convict
Sometime later, defendant informed Corona ions. However, defendant first offered test
that his contact agreed to arrange for the loan. mony of his prior convictions on direct ex*
Defendant agreed to transfer all the necessary mination. Defendant argues that this was a
documents between Corona and the contact attempt to mitigate the result of the court'
telling him that the contact supervised the ruling.
SBA loan department at Valley Bank & Trust
Without a record of a ruling below, w
Co. (Valley Bank).
cannot review the trial court's alleged erroi
Defendant later contacted Corona and told "A general rule of appellate review in crimini
him be needed $5,000 to complete the paper- cases in Utah is that a contemporaneous obj
work for the loan. Defendant asked that the ection or some form of specific preservatioi
$5,000 be delivered to him personally in cash.
of claims of error must be made a part of th
Corona delivered a cashier's check for $5,000
trial court record before an appellate com
made payable to defendant. When Corona
will review such claim on appeal." State v
inquired, defendant assured him that he had
77//man, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). Se
received the check and had spoken with the
also Boston v. State, 185 Ga. App. 740, 36
contact.
S.E.2d 885, 887 (1988); Stare v. Cordova, 10
In August 1987, defendant informed Corona
N.M. 643, 674 P.2d 533, 536 (Ct. App. 1983)
that his contact required another $5,000. This
and DeLeon v. State, 758 S.W.2d 621, 62
time Corona made the cishier's check payable
to Richard L. Gray because that was the name (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). Where the court has no
on the Valley Bank business card attached to made a ruling on a motion in limine, an<
Corona's loan papers. Defendant returned the where defendant fails to invoke a ruling on hi
check and told Corona that Gray did not want motion, he has waived the issue for purpose
his name involved in the transaction and that J of appeal. DeLong v. State, 185 Ga. App
Corona should make out a new check payable ] 314, 363 S.E.2d 811, 811-12 (1987), cert
to defendant. Corona provided the new check denied 185 Ga. App. 909. "As a general rule i
is the objecting party's obligation to obtain .
to defendant.
ruling on the objection, or such objection i
Sometime after Corona delivered the second
waived on appeal." Fixico v. State, 735 P.2<
check, defendant told Corona he needed a co580, 583 (Okl. Ct. Crim. App. 1987). In th
signer for an SBA loan to rent equipment.
case at bar, defendant did not invoke a ruling

CODE*Co
Provo. Utah

State v. (

nor did defendant object upon introduction of
the evidence of prior convictions because he
was the one to first introduce this evidence.
Without a record of the ruling upon the
motion in limine or of timely objections, we
are left with nothing to review.
PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's
comments about defendant's prior convictions
made in closing argument constituted grounds
for a mistrial. During his closing argument,
the prosecutor stated:
The fact that a witness has been
convicted of a felony and/or
convicted of a crime involving dishonest (sic] or false statement b to
be used by you only in weighing his
credibility.
I'm not saying, "Find Mr. Ortiz
guilty of theft by deception because
he's previously been convicted of
theft by deception, and he's previously been convicted of a communications fraud.
Even though the dates of those
convictions are less than a year
apart in 1985, 1986, and now, he's
also charged in 1987 with identical
crimes, that is not the purpose of
the felony convictions. That is to be
used only if you find and believe
that such a fact indicates a person is
more likely to tell a falsehood. To
question his credibility.
I've heard other arguments in other
cases where it says, "Well, look, if
he gets on the stand and has to
admit to those felonies and take the
risk of being convicted on that, he
must be telling the truth.* Well, he
obviously didn't change his behavior from 1985 to '86.
At this point, defense counsel objected and the
objection was sustained. The prosecutor closed
with, 'The testimony is not believable, and it
is a basis for you to look at the prior felony
convictions.*
The two prongs of the test for determining
whether a prosecutor's actions and remarks
constitute misconduct and merit reversal are:
1) if the actions or remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters they would not be
justified in considering in determining their
verdict, and 2) under the circumstances of the
particular case, the error is substantial and
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there would have
been a more favorable result for the defendant. State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 447
(Utah 1989) (citing Stare v. TTHman, 750 P.2d
at 555); See also West Valley City v. RJslow,
736 P.2d 637, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In
determining whether the prosecutor's remarks

to the jury about defendant's prior recent
convictions were in error, we note that defense
counsel first elicited testimony concerning the
prior convictions in direct examination of the
defendant:
v
Q. N o w , you were—do you
remember when you were arrested
and charged for this situation?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And about when was that?
A. November.
Q. Of what year?
A. Of 1987.
Q. Now, prior to November of
*87, had you been convicted of
prior felonies?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And on or about June 27th of
1987, bad you been convicted of a
communications fraud felony?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And August 1st, 1985, had
you been convicted of a theft by
deception felony?
> ,,
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Had you ever communicated
to Mr. Hansen anything about your
criminal record?
A. Yes he knew.
Q. Did he know about that?
A. Yes.
Later, the prosecutor raised the issue of the
prior convictions on cross-examination.
Defense counsel did not object. In his dosing
arguments, the prosecutor was not calling the
jury's attention to new matters, but was
merely discussing matters that had already
been before the jury twice. Furthermore, the
prosecutor reminded the jury that the evidence
of the prior convictions could only be used for
credibility purposes.
Finally, the possible prejudice caused by the
prosecutor's comments was mitigated by the
court's instruction:
You are instructed that the fact that
a witness had been convicted of a
felony and/or convicted of any
crime involving dishonesty or false
statements is to be used by you only
in weighing his credibility, and it is
to be so used only if you find and
believe that such a fact indicates a
person is more likely to tdl a falsehood.
"(!]f there had been any implication adverse to
the defendant, the trial judge gave an appropriate cautionary instruction which it should
be assumed that conscientious jurors would
follow.' State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502
P.2d 113, 115 (Utah 1972). Therefore, we find
that any prejudicial error that occurred during
the closing remarks was harmless.

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In a jury trial in a criminal proceeding, w<
review the evidence and all inferences which
may reasonably be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict. Statt
v. Petrec, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). *W<
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evi«
dene* only when the evidence, to viewed, h
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have enter
tained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convi
cted.* 7o*. See also State v. Lamm, 606 P.2c
229, 231 (Utah 1980); State v. Daniels, 5 *
P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah 1978). Defendani
contends that the evidence was insufficient tc
prove intent and to support the jury verdio
but be provides no analysis, no citation to th<
record, and no supporting case law. We hav<
consistently held that if counsel on appea
does not provide citations to the record, w<
need not reach the merits of his or her subst
antive claims. See, e.g.. Arnica Mut. las. Co
v. Schett/er, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah Ct. App
1989).
We affirm the trial court and hold tha
defendant's prior convictions were properl;
admitted and that the prosecutor's closinj
remarks did not rise to the level of prejudio
warranting a new trial.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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State of Utah,

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Case No* 880378-CA

Raymond Ortiz,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant's petition for rehearing is hereby denied.
DATED this
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FOR THE COURT

^AA(2C^
Mary K\ Noonan, Clerk

day of November, 1989.
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Randall Gaither
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#1141
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
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Telephone: (801) 531-1990
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER SUPPLEMENTING THE
RECORD

vs.
Judge

Kenneth Rigtrup

RAYMOND ORTIZ,
Civil No.

CR88-163

Defendant*

The above-entitled case came for hearing before the Court on
Defendant's Motion to Supplement the Record on Monday, November 13,
1989.

The State of Utah was represented by David Thompson of the

Attorney Generals Office and the Defendant was present court
represented by Randall Gaither, Attorney at Law. Based upon Rule
30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 12(h) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the record in this case, which was
remitted on November 8, 1989, from the Utah Court of Appeals back
to the trial court, is supplemented as follows:
1. On March 31, 1988, the Defendant argued to the trial court
a motion

concerning

the use by

the Prosecution

of

prior

convictionTof Communication Fraud and Theft by Deception under Rule
609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence* (See transcript of Pre-Trial
Hearing, Pages 2 and 3.)
2.

The Defendant, through his counsel, argued that under

Rule 609, sub-paragraph (a), the Court was to make a weighing
process concerning the probative value of admitting the evidence
and that the Court could not merely because of the title of the
prior offenses of Theft by Deception or Communication Fraud, find
that

the

offenses

involved

dishonesty

or

false

statements.

(Transcript of 3/31/88, Page 5 and 6)
3.

The Defendant also moved the Court under Rule 403 of the

Utah Rules of Evidence to determine the prejudicial effect of the
convictions in a case involving similar offenses against Mr. Ortiz.
(Transcript of 3/31/88, Page 6)
4. The Court took the matter under advisement indicating that
the Court would review the rules on the case and advise the
Defendant prior to the point in trial that evidence would become
admissable. (Transcript of 3/31/88, Page 10)
5. The Defendant indicated to the trial court that would
admonish the prosecution not to allow into evidence any reference
to the prior convictions until the Court made a ruling on the
motions. (Transcript of 3/31/88, Page 11)
6. The Court, off the record and without making any findings
of fact or making any reference on the record to any factors
concerning the Court's decision, denied the Defendant's pre-trial
motion to limit the use of prior convictions of the

Defendant.
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, 1989,

BY THE COURT:

Jk.

HON.) KENNETH
District Court

MAILING CERTIFICATE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was mailed to David Thompson, Assistant Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.
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